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SUMMARY
Transaction-level modeling with SystemC has been very successful in describing the behavior of embedded
systems by providing high-level executable models, in which many of them have inherent probabilistic
behaviors, e.g., random data and unreliable components. It thus is crucial to have both quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the probabilities of system properties.
Such analysis can be conducted by constructing a formal model of the system under verification and using
Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC). However, this method is infeasible for large systems, due to the state
space explosion. In this article, we demonstrate the successful use of Statistical Model Checking (SMC) to
carry out such analysis directly from large SystemC models and allow designers to express a wide range of
useful properties.
The first contribution of this work is a framework to verify properties expressed in Bounded Linear Temporal
Logic (BLTL) for SystemC models with both timed and probabilistic characteristics.
Second, the framework allows users to expose a rich set of user-code primitives as atomic propositions in
BLTL. Moreover, users can define their own fine-grained time resolution rather than the boundary of clock
cycles in the SystemC simulation.
The third contribution is an implementation of a statistical model checker. It contains an automatic monitor
generation for producing execution traces of the model-under-verification (MUV), the mechanism for
automatically instrumenting the MUV, and the interaction with statistical model checking algorithms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Transaction-level modeling (TLM) with SystemC has become increasingly prominent in describing
the behavior of embedded systems [7], e.g., System-on-Chips (SoCs). Complex electronic
components and software control units can be combined into a single model, enabling simulation
of the whole system at once. In many cases, models have probabilistic and non-deterministic
characteristics, e.g, random data and reliability of the system’s components. Hence, it is crucial
to evaluate the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the probabilities of system properties.
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1.1. Motivation
We consider a safety-critical system, e.g., a control system for an air-traffic, automotive, or medical
device. The reliability and availability of the system can be modeled as a stochastic process,
in which it exhibits both timed and probabilistic characteristics. For instance, the reliability and
availability model of an embedded control system [21] that contains an input processor connected
to groups of sensors, an output processor connected to groups of actuators, and a main processor
that communicates with the I/O processors through a bus. Suppose that the sensors, actuators, and
processors can fail and the I/O processors have transient and permanent faults. When a transient
fault occurs in a processor, rebooting the processor repairs the fault. The times to failure and the
delay of reboot are exponentially distributed. Thus, the reliability of the system can be modeled by
a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) [40, 12] (a special case of a discrete-state stochastic
process in which the probability distribution of the next state depends only on the current state).
The analysis can be quantifying the probabilities or rates of all safety-related faults: How likely is
it that the system is available to meet a demand for service? What is the probability that the system
repairs after a failure (e.g., the system conforms to the existent and prominent standards such as the
Safety Integrity Levels (SILs))?
In order to conduct such analysis, a general approach is modeling and analyzing a probabilistic
model of the system (e.g., Markov chains, stochastic processes), in which the algorithm for
computing the measures in properties depends on the class of systems being considered and the logic
used for specifying the property. Many algorithms with the corresponding mature tools are based
on model checking techniques that compute the probability by a numerical approach [5, 8, 34, 16].
Timed automata with mature verification tools such as UPPAAL [22] are used to verify real-time
systems. For a variety of probabilistic systems, the most popular modeling formalism is Markov
chain or Markov decision processes, for which Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) tools such as
PRISM [17] and MRMC [20] can be used. PMC is widely used and has been successfully applied
to the verification of a range of timed and probabilistic systems. One of the main challenges is the
complexity of the algorithms in terms of execution time and memory space due to the size of the
state space that tends to grow exponentially, also known as the state space explosion. As a result, the
analysis is infeasible. In addition, these tools cannot work directly with the SystemC source code,
meaning that a formal model of SystemC model needs to be provided.
An alternative way to evaluate these systems is Statistical Model Checking (SMC), a simulation-
based approach. Simulation-based approaches produce an approximation of the value to be
evaluated, based on a finite set of system’s executions. Clearly, compared to the numerical
approaches, a simulation-based solution does not provide an exact answer. However, users can tune
the statistical parameters such as the absolute error and the level of confidence, according to the
requirements. Simulation-based approaches do not construct all the reachable states of the model-
under-verification (MUV), thus they require far less execution time and memory space than the
numerical approaches. For some real-life systems, they are the only option [43] and have shown the
advantages over other methods such as PMC [16, 19].
1.2. Contribution
In this article, we demonstrate the successful use of SMC to carry out directly qualitative and
quantitative analysis for probabilistic temporal properties of large SystemC models. SMC also
allows designers to express a wide range of useful properties. The work makes the following
contributions.
• We propose a framework to verify bounded temporal properties for SystemC models with
both timed and probabilistic characteristics. The framework contains two main components:
a monitor observing a set of execution traces of the MUV and a statistical model checker
implementing a set of hypothesis testing algorithms. We use techniques proposed by Tabakov
et al. [37] to automatically generate the monitor. The statistical model checker is implemented
as a plugin of the checker Plasma Lab [3], in which the properties to be verified are expressed
in Bounded Linear Temporal Logic (BLTL).
Copyright c© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Softw. Evol. and Proc. (2016)
Prepared using smrauth.cls DOI: 10.1002/smr
STATISTICAL MODEL CHECKING FOR PROBABILISTIC SYSTEMC MODELS 3
• We present a method that allows users to expose a rich set of user-code primitives in form of
atomic propositions in BLTL. These propositions help users exposing the state of the SystemC
simulation kernel and the full state of the SystemC source code model. In addition, users can
define their own fine-grained time resolution that is used to reason about the semantics of
the logic expressing the properties rather than the boundary of clock cycles in the SystemC
simulation.
• We implement a tool, in which the properties of interest are expressed using BLTL. The
various features of the tool including automatic generation of monitor for generating execution
traces of the MUV, mechanism to instrument automatically the MUV, and the interaction with
statistical model checking algorithms are presented. We demonstrate our approach through a
running example, as well as the performance of the framework through some experiments.
• To make our verification perform on all possible execution orders of the MUV, we implement a
probabilistic scheduler. Specifically, the source of process scheduling is the evaluation phase
in the current SystemC scheduler implementation, in which one of the runnable processes
is executed. Every time at the evaluation phase, given a set of N runnable processes, our
probabilistic scheduler randomly chooses one of these processes to execute. The random
algorithm is implemented by generating a random integer number uniformly over the range
[0, N − 1].
2. BACKGROUND
This section introduces the SystemC modeling language and reviews the main features of statistical
model checking for stochastic processes as well as bounded linear temporal logic which is used to
express system properties.
2.1. SystemC Language
2.1.1. Language Features SystemC† is a C++ library [13] providing primitives for modeling
hardware and software systems at the level of transactions. Every SystemC model can be compiled
with a standard C++ compiler to produce an executable program called executable specification.
This specification is used to simulate the system behavior with the provided event-driven simulator.
A SystemC model is a hierarchical composition of modules ( sc module ). Modules are building
blocks of SystemC design, they are like modules in Verilog [39], classes in C++. A module consists
of an interface for communicating with other modules and a set of processes running concurrently
to describe the functionality of the module. An interface contains ports ( sc port ) that are similar
to the hardware pins. Modules are interconnected using either primitive channels (e.g., the signals,
sc signal ) or hierarchical channels via their ports. Channels are data containers that generate events
in the simulation kernel whenever the contained data changes.
Processes are not hierarchical, so no process can call another process directly. A process is either
a thread or a method. A thread process ( sc thread ) can suspend its execution by calling the library
statement wait or any of its variants. When the execution is resumed, it will continue from that
point. Threads run only once during the execution of the program and are not expected to terminate.
On the other hand, a method process ( sc method ) cannot suspend its execution by calling wait and
is expected to terminate. Thus, it only returns the control to the kernel when reaching the end of its
body.
An event is an instance of the SystemC event class ( sc event ) whose occurrence triggers or
resumes the execution of a process. All processes which are suspended by waiting for an event
are resumed when this event occurs, we say that the event is notified. A module’s process can be
sensitive to a list of events. For example, a process may suspend itself and wait for a value change
of a specific signal. Then, only this event occurrence can resume the execution of the process. In
†IEEE Standard 1666-2005
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general, a process can wait for an event, a combination of events, or for an amount of time to be
resumed.
In SystemC, integer values are used as discrete time model. The smallest quantum of time that can
be represented is called time resolution, meaning that any time value smaller than the time resolution
will be rounded off. The available time resolutions are femtosecond , picosecond , nanosecond ,
microsecond , millisecond , and second . SystemC provides functions to set time resolution and
declare a time object.
The example in Fig. 1 describes a simple delay flip-flop, in which sc in and sc out are predefined
primitive input and output ports. The sensitivity list contains the edge sensitivity sensitive pos
specified on clk , which indicates that only on the rising edge of clk does din get transferred to
dout . The sensitivity list and process instantiation are defined in the class constructor ( sc ctor ).
Figure 1. An Implementation of Flip-Flop in SystemC.
2.1.2. Simulation Kernel The SystemC simulator is an event-driven simulation [1, 28]. It
establishes a hierarchical network of finite number of parallel communicating processes which are
under the supervision of the distinguished simulation kernel process. Only one process is dispatched
by the scheduler to run at a time point, and the scheduler is non-preemptive, that is, the running
process returns control to the kernel only when it finishes executing or explicitly suspends itself
by calling wait . Like hardware modeling languages, the SystemC scheduler supports the notion
of delta-cycles [24]. A delta-cycle lasts for an infinitesimal amount of time and is used to impose
a partial order of simultaneous actions which interprets zero-delay semantics. Thus, the simulation
time is not advanced when the scheduler processes a delta-cycle. During a delta-cycle, the scheduler
executes actions in two phases: the evaluate and the update phases. The semantics of the scheduler
is given in Fig. 2. Each phase of the scheduler is explained as follows.
• Initialize. During the initialization, each process is executed once unless it is turned off by
calling dont initialize() , or until a synchronization point (e.g., a wait ) is reached. The order
in which these processes are executed is unspecified.
• Evaluate. The kernel starts a delta-cycle and runs all processes that are ready to run one at a
time. In this same phase a process can be made ready to run by an event notification.
• Update. Execute any pending calls to update() resulting from calls to request update() in
the evaluate phase. Note that a primitive channel uses request update() to have the kernel
call its update() function after the execution of processes.
• Delta-cycle Notification. The kernel enters the delta notification phase where notified events
trigger their dependent processes. Note that immediate notifications may make new processes
Copyright c© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Softw. Evol. and Proc. (2016)
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Figure 2. Semantics of SystemC kernel.
runnable during step (2). If so the kernel loops back to step (2) and starts another evaluation
phase and a new delta-cycle. It does not advance simulation time.
• Simulation-cycle Notification. If there are no more runnable processes, the kernel advances
simulation time to the earliest pending timed notification. All processes sensitive to this event
are triggered and the kernel loops back to step (2) and starts a new delta-cycle. This process
is finished when all processes have terminated or the specified simulation time is passed.
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2.2. Bounded Linear Temporal Logic
We here recall the syntax and semantics of BLTL [35], an extension of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
with time bounds on temporal operators. A formula ϕ is defined over a set of atomic propositions
AP which can be either true or false . A BLTL formula is defined by the following BNF grammar,
in which true and false are Boolean constants. The time bound T is an amount of time or a number
of states in an execution trace.
ϕ ::= true | false | p ∈ AP | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 U≤T ϕ2
The temporal modalities F (the “eventually”, sometimes in the future) and G (the “always”, from
now on forever) can be derived from the “until” U as follows.
F≤T ϕ = true U≤T ϕ and G≤T ϕ = ¬ F≤T ¬ϕ
The semantics of BLTL is defined with respect to execution traces of a model M. Let ω =
(s0, t0)(s1, t1) · · · (sN−1, tN−1) · · · , where N ∈ N, be a sequence of pairs of states and time
points, where the model stays in the state si for ti+1 − ti = δti ∈ R≥0 duration of time. The
sequence ω is called an execution trace of M. We use ωk = (s0, t0)(s1, t1) · · · (sk−1, tk−1) and
ωk = (sk, tk)(sk+1, tk+1) · · · to denote the prefix and suffix of ω respectively. We denote the fact
that ω satisfies the BLTL formula ϕ by ω |= ϕ. The semantics is given as follows.
• ωk |= true and ωk 6|= false
• ωk |= p, p ∈ AP iff p ∈ L(sk), where L(sk) ⊆ AP is the set of atomic propositions which
are true in state sk
• ωk |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff ωk |= ϕ1 and ωk |= ϕ2
• ωk |= ¬ϕ iff ωk 6|= ϕ
• ωk |= ϕ1 U≤T ϕ2 iff there exists i ∈ N such that ωk+i |= ϕ2, Σ0<j≤i(tk+j − tk+j−1) ≤ T ,
and for each 0 ≤ j < i, ωk+j |= ϕ1
Here is a simple temporal property expressed in BLTL that can be verified with SMC:
ϕ = G≤T1 ( A → F≤T2 ( B U≤T3 C ))
The meaning of Pr (ϕ) is: What is the probability that during the T1 time units of the system
operation, if A holds then, starting from T2 time units after, B happens before C within T3 time
units?
2.3. Statistical Model Checking
LetM be the formal model of the MUV (e.g., a stochastic process, a CTMC) and ϕ be a property
expressed as a BLTL formula. BLTL ensures that the satisfaction of a formula is decidable in a finite
number of steps. The statistical model checking [23] problem consists in answering the following
questions:
• Qualitative Analysis. Is the probability that M satisfies ϕ greater or equal to a threshold θ
with a specific level of statistical confidence?
• Quantitative Analysis. What is the probability that M satisfies ϕ with a specific level of
statistical confidence?
They are denoted by M |= Pr≥θ(ϕ) and M |= Pr (ϕ), respectively. Many statistical model
checkers have been implemented [3, 42, 16, 19] that have shown their advantages over other methods
such as PMC on several case studies.
The key idea is to associate each execution trace ofM with a discrete random Bernoulli variable
Bi. The outcome for Bi, denoted by bi, is 1 if the trace satisfies ϕ and 0 otherwise. The predominant
statistical method for verifying M |= Pr≥θ(ϕ) is based on hypothesis testing. Let p = Pr (ϕ),
to determine whether p ≥ θ, we test the hypothesis H0 : p ≥ p0 = θ + δ against the alternative
Copyright c© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Softw. Evol. and Proc. (2016)
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hypothesis H1 : p ≤ p1 = θ − δ based on the observations of Bi. The size of indifference region is
defined by p0 − p1 = 2δ. If we take acceptance of H0 to mean acceptance of Pr≥θ(ϕ) as true and
acceptance of H1 to mean rejection of Pr≥θ(ϕ) as false, then we can use acceptance sampling (e.g.,
Younes in [41] has proposed two solutions, called single sampling plan and sequential probability
ratio test) to verify Pr≥θ(ϕ). An acceptance sampling test with strength (α, β), where α, β ∈ [0, 1],
guarantees that H1 is accepted with probability at most α when H0 holds and H0 is accepted with
probability at most β when H1 holds, called a Type-I error (false negative) and Type-II error (false
positive), respectively. The probability of accepting H0 is therefore at least 1− α. We say that 1− α
is the confidence of the hypothesis testing.
To answer the quantitative question, M |= Pr (ϕ), an alternative statistical method, based
on estimation instead of hypothesis testing, has been developed. For instance, the probability
estimations are based on results derived by Chernoff and Hoeffding bounds [18]. This approach
uses n observations b1, ..., bn to compute an approximation of p: p˜ = 1nΣ
n
i=1bi. If we require that the
probability that difference between the approximation and the actual value is bounded by δ ∈ [0, 1]
is at least 1− α, where α ∈ [0, 1], or Pr [|p˜− p| < δ] ≥ 1− α. Then, based on the theorem of
Hoeffding, the number of observations which is determined from the absolute error δ and the
confidence 1− α is n = d 12δ2 log 2αe.
Although SMC can only provide approximate results with a user-specified level of statistical
confidence, it is compensated for by its better scalability and resource consumption. Since the
models to be analyzed are often approximately known, an approximate result in the analysis of
desired properties within specific bounds is quite acceptable. SMC has recently been applied in
a wide range of research areas including software engineering [16] (e.g., verification of critical
embedded systems), system biology, or medical area [19].
3. A RUNNING EXAMPLE
We will use a simple case study with a First-In First-Out (FIFO) channel as a running example
(see Fig. 3 with the graphical notations in [13]). This example illustrates how designers can
create hierarchical channels that encapsulate both design structure and communication protocols.
In the design, once a nanosecond the producer will write one character to the FIFO channel with
probability p1, while the consumer will read one character from the FIFO channel with probability
p2. The FIFO channel which is derived from sc channel encapsulates the communication protocol
between the producer and the consumer.
Producer FIFO Consumer
Figure 3. Every 1 nanosecond, the producer writes 1 character to the FIFO channel with probability p1,
while the consumer reads 1 character with probability p2. The FIFO channel is designed to ensure that all
data is reliably delivered despite the varying rates of production and consumption
The FIFO channel is designed to ensure that all data is reliably delivered despite the varying rates
of production and consumption. The channel uses an event notification handshake protocol for both
the input and output. It uses a circular buffer implemented within a static array to store and retrieve
the items within the FIFO channel. We assume that the sizes of the messages and the FIFO buffer
are fixed. Hence, it is obvious that the time required to transfer completely a message, or message
latency, depends on the production and consumption rates, the FIFO buffer size, the message size,
and the probabilities of successful writing and reading. The full implementation of the example can
be obtained at the website of our tool [33, 31], in which the probabilities of writing and reading are
implemented with the Bernoulli distributions with probabilities p1 and p2 respectively from GNU
Scientific Library (GSL) [14].
The quantitative analysis under consideration is: What is the probability that each single message
is transferred completely (e.g., including the message delimiters) within T1 nanoseconds during T
Copyright c© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Softw. Evol. and Proc. (2016)
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nanoseconds of operation? This kind of analysis can, thus, be conducted in the early design steps.
To formulate the underlying property more precisely, we have to take into account the agreement
protocol between the producer and consumer, e.g., a simple protocol can be every message has
special starting delimiter with the character ’&’ and ending delimiter with the character ’@’. Thus,
the property can be translated in BLTL as follows:
ϕ = G≤T (( c read = ′&′)→ F≤T1 ( c read = ′@′))
where c read is the character read in the FIFO channel by the consumer. The input providing to
the SMC checker is Pr (ϕ). This property is expressed in terms of the characters read in the FIFO
channel by the consumer, but the communication protocol between the producer and the consumer
is abstracted at a very high level. It is an illustration of a type of property that can be checked on
TLM specifications. Consider a concrete implementation of the communication protocol between
the producer and the consumer at Register-Transfer Level (RTL), if a property is satisfiable at the
transaction level then it is so at the register-transfer level. Therefore, the verification of such a
property at the transaction level can be connected to its counterpart at RTL in order to check the
correctness of RTL implementations.
4. SMC FOR SYSTEMC MODELS
In order to apply SMC for SystemC models which exhibit timed and probabilistic characteristics,
this section presents the concepts of state and execution trace for SystemC. It also shows that the
operational semantics of this class of SystemC models can be considered as stochastic processes.
4.1. SystemC Model State
Temporal logic formulas are interpreted over execution traces and traditionally a trace has been
defined as a sequence of states in the execution of a model. Thus before we can define an execution
trace we need a precise definition of the state of a SystemC model simulation. We are inspired by
the definition of system state in [37], which consists of the state of the simulation kernel and the
state of the SystemC model user-code. We consider the external libraries as black boxes, meaning
that their states are not exposed.
Let Sp be the set of simulation kernel phases, Ev be the set of all events, and X be the set of all
variables in the model that includes all module attributes, ports, and channels. Let F be the set of all
functions in the model, a configuration of the call stack is represented by a tuple (f, fp, fr) where
f ∈ F is the executing function, fp is its parameters, and fr is its return values. Let Cs be the set
of all call stack configurations. Let Loc be the set of all locations, e.g., a specific statement reached
during the execution and Proc is the set of all statuses of all module processes in the model. Then
a state is formally represented by a tuple (sp, ev, σ, l, cs, proc) where:
• sp ∈ Sp is the current phase of the simulation kernel, e.g., delta-cycle notification, simulation-
cycle simulation,
• ev ∈ 2Ev is the set of events that are notified during the execution of the model,
• σ : X → DX is a map from variables to its domain values,
• l ∈ Loc is the current location,
• cs ∈ Cs is the current configuration of the call stack,
• proc ∈ Proc is the current status of the module processes, e.g., suspended or runnable.
We consider here some examples about states of the simulation kernel and the SystemC model
user-code. Assume that a SystemC model has an event named e , then the model state can contain
information such as the kernel is at the end of simulation-cycle notification phase and the event e
is notified.
Consider the running example again, a state can be the information about the characters received
by the consumer, represented by the variable with type char, c read . It also contains the information
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about the location of the program counter right before and after a call of the function send() in
the module Producer that are represented by two Boolean variables send start and send done ,
respectively. These variables hold the value true immediately before and after a call of the function
send() , respectively.
Another example, we consider a module that has statements at different locations in the source
code, in which these statements contain the division operator “/” followed by zero or more spaces
and the variable “ a ” (e.g., the statement y = (x + 1)/a ). Then, a Boolean variable which holds the
value true right before the execution of all such statements can be used as a part of the states.
Let S be the (finite or infinite) set of all states of the model. We use V = {v0, ..., vn−1} to denote
the finite set of variables of primitive type (e.g, usual scalar or enumerated type in C/C++) whose
value domain DV = Dv0 × · · · ×Dvn−1 ⊆ S represents the states of a SystemC model.
We have discussed so far the state of a SystemC model execution. It remains to discuss how the
semantics of the temporal operators is interpreted over the states in the execution of the model. That
means how the states are sampled in order to make the transition from one state to another state.
The following definition gives the concept of temporal resolution, in which the states are evaluated
only at instances in which the temporal resolution holds. It allows the user to set granularity of time.
Definition 1 (Temporal Resolution)
A temporal resolution Tr is a disjunction of a finite set of Boolean expressions defined over V . It
specifies when the set of variables V is evaluated to generate a new state.
Temporal resolution can be used to define a more fine-grained model of time than a coarse-grained
one provided by a cycle-based simulation. We call the expressions in Tr temporal events. Whenever
a temporal event is satisfied, or we say that the temporal event occurs, V is sampled.
For example, in the producer and consumer model, assume that we want the satisfaction of
the underlying BLTL formula ϕ to be checked whenever at either the end of simulation-cycle
notification or immediately after the event write event is notified during a run of the model. Hence,
we can define a temporal resolution as Tr = { end sc , we notified }, where end sc and we notified
are Boolean expressions that have the value true whenever the kernel phase is at the end of the
simulation-cycle notification and the event write event notified, respectively.
We denote the set of occurrences of temporal events from Tr along an execution of a SystemC
model by T sr , called a temporal resolution set. The value of a variable v ∈ V at an event occurrence
ec ∈ T sr is defined by a mapping ξvval : T sr → Dv, where Dv is the value domain of v.
A mapping ξt : T sr → T is called a time event that identifies the simulation time at each
occurrence of an event from the temporal resolution. Hence, the set of time points, called time tag,
which corresponds to a temporal resolution set T sr = {ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N, is given as follows.
Definition 2 (Time Tag)
Given a temporal resolution set T sr , the time tag T corresponding to T sr is a finite or infinite set of
non-negative reals {t0, t1, ..., tN−1}, where ti+1 − ti = δti ∈ R≥0 and ti = ξt(eci).
Therefore, the state of the SystemC model at an event occurrence ec ∈ T sr (with the corresponding
simulation time t = ξt(ec)) is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Model State)
Let V = {v0, ..., vn−1} be a finite set of variables and Tr be a temporal resolution. Then the state of
the model at the simulation time t = ξt(ec), written (s, t), is defined by a tuple (ξv0val, ..., ξ
vn−1
val ).
4.2. Model and Execution Trace
A SystemC model can be viewed as a hierarchical network of parallel communicating processes.
Hence, the execution of a SystemC model is an alternation of the control between the model’s
processes, the external libraries and the kernel process. The execution of the processes is supervised
by the kernel process to concurrently update new values for the signals and variables with respect
to the cycle-based simulation. For example, given a set of runnable processes in a simulation-cycle,
the kernel chooses one of them to execute first as described in the prior section.
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Let V be the set of variables whose values represent the states of a SystemC model. The values
of variables in V are samples of the set of states S. A state can be considered as a random variable
following an unknown probability distribution defined from all given probability distributions in
the SystemC source code model. Given a temporal resolution Tr and its corresponding temporal
resolution set along an execution of the model T sr = {ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N, the evaluation of
V at the event occurrence eci is defined by the tuple (ξ
v0
val, ..., ξ
vn−1
val ), or a state of the model at
eci , denoted by V (eci) = (V (eci)(v0), V (eci)(v1), ..., V (eci)(vn−1)), where V (eci)(vk) = ξ
vk
val(eci)
with k = 0, ..., n− 1 is the value of the variable vk at eci .
We denote the set of all possible evaluations by VT sr ⊆ DV , called the state space of the
random variables in V . State changes are observed only at the moments of event occurrences.
Hence, the operational semantics of a SystemC model is represented by a stochastic process
{(V (eci), ξt(eci)), eci ∈ T sr }i∈N, taking values in VT sr ×R≥0 and indexed by the parameter eci ,
which are event occurrences in the temporal resolution set T sr . An execution trace is a realization of
the stochastic process and is given as follows.
Definition 4 (Execution Trace)
An execution trace of a SystemC model corresponding to a temporal resolution set T sr =
{ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N is a sequence of states and event occurrence times, denoted by ω =
(s0, t0)...(sN−1, tN−1), such that for each i ∈ 0, ..., N − 1, si = V (eci) and ti = ξt(eci).
The value N is called the length (finite or infinite) of the execution, also denoted by |ω|. Given
V ′ ⊆ V , the projection of ω on V ′, written ω ↓V ′ , is an execution trace such that |ω ↓V ′ | = |ω| and
∀v ∈ V ′, ∀ec ∈ T sr , V ′(ec)(v) = V (ec)(v).
4.3. Properties Expressing
Our framework accepts input properties of the forms Pr (ϕ), Pr≥θ(ϕ), and X≤T (rv), where ϕ is a
BLTL formula. The former is used to compute the probability that ϕ is satisfied by the model. The
latter asserts that this probability is at least equal to the threshold θ. The last one returns the mean
value of random variable rv.
The set of atomic propositions AP in the logic which describes SystemC code features and the
simulation semantics is a set of Boolean expressions defined over a subset of V called observed
variables and the standard operators (+,−, ∗, /,>,≥, <,≤, ! =,=). The semantics of the temporal
operators in BLTL formulas interpreted over states is defined by a temporal resolution. In other
words, the temporal resolution determines how the states are sampled in order to make the transition
from one state to another state. The observed variables and temporal resolutions supported by the
framework are summarized below; see the tool manual‡ for the full syntax and semantics. It should
be noted that the current implementation only supports the use of simulation phases, locations, and
events to define temporal resolutions. The implementation provides a mechanism that allows users
to declare observed variables in order to define the set of propositions AP via a high-level language
in a configuration file as the input of our tool.
• Attribute. Users can define an observed variable whose value and type are equal to the value
and type of a module’s attribute in the user code. Attributes can be public, protected, or private.
For example, attribute a.t a t defines a variable named a t whose value and type are equal
to the value and type of the private attribute t of the module instance a .
• Function. Let f() be a C++ function with k arguments in the user code. Users can refer to
locations in the source code that contain the function call, immediately after the function call,
immediately before the first executable statement, and immediately after the last executable
statement in f() by using Boolean observed variables f : call , f : return , f : entry , and
f : exit , respectively. Moreover, users can define an observed variable f : i , with i = 0...k,
whose value and type are equal to the value and type of the return object (with i = 0)
or ith argument of function f() before executing the first statement in the function body.
‡http://project.inria.fr/pscv/en/documentation/
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For example, if the function int div(int x, int y) is defined in the user code, then the
formula G≤T ( div : entry → div : 2 ! = 0) asserts that the divisor is nonzero whenever the
div function starts execution.
• Simulation Phase. There are 18 predefined Boolean observed variables which refer to the
18 kernel states [33]. These variables are usually used to define a temporal resolution.
For example, the formula G≤T (p = 0) which is accompanied with the temporal resolution
MON DELTA CYCLE END requires the value of variable p to be zero at the end of every
delta-cycle.
• Event. For each SystemC event e, the framework provides a Boolean observed variable
e.notified that is true only when the simulation kernel actually notifies e. For example,
the formula G≤T ( e.notified ) which is accompanied with the temporal resolution
MON UPDATE PHASE END says that the event e is notified at the end of every update
phase.
Referring to the running example, the declaration location send start ”%Producer
:: send()” : call declares a Boolean variable send start that holds the value true immediately
before the execution of the model reaches a call site of the function send() in the module
Producer . The characters received by the consumer which is represented by the variable c read
can be declared as attribute pnt con → c int c read , where pnt con is a pointer to the
Consumer object and c int is an attribute of the Consumer module representing the received
character. Then the considered property of the running example can be constructed by using the
following predicates defined over the variable c read : c read =′ &′ and c read =′ @′.
Another example, assume that we want to answer the following question: “Over a period of T
time units, is the probability that the number of elements in the FIFO buffer is between n1 and n2
greater or equal to θ with the confidence 1− α”? The predicates that need to be defined in order to
construct the underlying BLTL formula are n1 ≤ nelements and nelements ≤ n2, where nelements is an
integer variable that represents the current number of elements in the FIFO buffer (it captures the
value of the num elements attribute in the Fifo module). Then, the property is translated in BLTL
with the operator “always” as follows. Pr≥θ(ϕ) and the confidence 1− α are given as inputs to the
checker.
ϕ = G≤T ((n1 ≤ nelements ) & ( nelements ≤ n2))
5. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented an SMC-based verification tool [30, 31], PSCV, that contains two main
original components: a Monitor and Aspect-advice Generator (MAG) and a Statistical Model
Checker (SystemC Plugin). The tool whose architecture is depicted in Fig. 4 is considered as a
runtime verification tool for probabilistic temporal properties.
5.1. The Architecture
It consists of the following off-the-self, modified and original components.
• An off-the-self component, AspectC++ [11], a C++ Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP)
compiler for instrumenting the MUV.
• A modified component, a patch SystemC-2.3.0 for facilitating the communication between
the kernel and the monitor and implementing a random scheduler.
• Two original components are MAG, a C++ tool for automatically generating monitor and
aspect-advices for instrumentation, and SystemC plugin, a plugin of the statistical model
checker Plasma Lab [3].
5.1.1. Execution Trace Extraction In principle, the full state can be observed during the simulation
of the model. In practice, however, users define a set of variables of interest, according to the
properties that the users want to verify, and only these variables appear in the states of an execution
Copyright c© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Softw. Evol. and Proc. (2016)
Prepared using smrauth.cls DOI: 10.1002/smr
12 NGO AND LEGAY
trace. Given a SystemC model, we use V obs ⊆ V to denote the set of variables, called observed
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MAG
Checker
Simulator
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AspectC++
Instrumenting
Patch SystemC-2.3
(Random Scheduler)
Compiling & Linking
Property
System
C Plugin - Plasm
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Figure 4. PSCV consists of off-the-self components (AspectC++ and Plasma Lab), modified component
(patch SystemC-2.3.0), and original components (MAG and SystemC plugin)
variables, to expose the states of the SystemC model. Then, the observed execution traces of the
model are the projections of the execution traces on V obs , meaning that for every execution trace ω,
the corresponding observed execution trace is ω ↓V obs . In the following, when we mention execution
traces, we mean observed execution traces.
In PSCV, based on the techniques in [37], the set of observed variables and temporal resolution
are converted into a C++ monitor class and a set of aspect-advices. MAG generates three files:
aspect definitions.ah containing a set of AspectC++ aspect definitions, monitor.h , and monitor.cc
implementing a monitor as a C++ class and another class called local observer that is responsible
for invoking the callback functions. The callback functions will invoke the sampling function at the
right time point during the MUV simulation.
The monitor has step() , a sampling function. It waits for a request from the SystemC Plugin. If
the request is stopping the current simulation, it then terminates the MUV’s execution. If the plugin
requests a new state, then the current values of all observed variables and the simulation time are
sent. The step() function is called at every time point defined by the temporal resolution. These
time points can be kernel phases, event notifications, or locations in the MUV code control flow. In
such cases, the patch SystemC kernel needs to communicate with the local observer , e.g., when a
delta-cycle ends, via a class called mon observer to invoke the step() function of the monitor. In
case of locations in the user-code, the advice code generated by MAG will call the callback function
to invoke the step() function.
The aspect in AspectC++ is an extension of the class concept of C++ to collect advice code
implementing a common crosscutting concern in a modular way. For example, to access all attributes
of a module called A and the location immediately before the first executable statement of the
function foo in A (defined in the configuration file with the syntax % A :: foo() : entry ). MAG
will generate the aspect definition in Fig. 5. The full syntax and semantics of aspects can be found
at the web-site of AspectC++ [2].
5.1.2. Statistical Model Checker The statistical model checker is implemented as a plugin of
Plasma Lab [3] that establishes a communication, in which the generated monitor transmits
execution traces of the MUV. In the current version, the communication is done via the standard
input and output. When a new state is requested, the monitor reports the current state (the values of
observed variables and the current simulation time) to the plugin. The length of traces depends on
the satisfaction of the formula to be verified, which is finite due to the bounded temporal operators.
Similarly, the required number of traces depends on the statistical algorithms in use (e.g.,
sequential hypothesis testing or 2-sided Chernoff bound). The full set of algorithms implemented in
Plasma Lab can be found at [32].
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Figure 5. Example of generated AspectC++ aspect.
5.1.3. Random Scheduler Verification does not only depend on the probabilistic characteristics of
the MUV, but it also can be significantly affected by scheduling policy. Consider a simple module
A consisting of two thread processes as shown in Fig. 6, where x is initialized to be 1. Assume
Figure 6. Example of deterministic execution order.
that we want to compute the probability that x is always equal to 1. Obviously, x depends on the
execution order of two threads, e.g., its value is 1 if t2 is executed before the execution of t1 and
0 if the order is t1 then t2 .
The current scheduling policy is deterministic, in which it always picks the process that is first
added into the queue (the current open-source SystemC kernel implementation uses a queue to
store a set of runnable processes). Hence, only one execution order, t1 then t2 , is verified instead
of two possible orders. As a result, the computed probability is 0, however, ideally it should be
0.5. Therefore, it is more interesting if a verification is performed on all possible execution orders
than a fixed one. In many cases, there is no decision or a` priori knowledge of the scheduling to
be implemented. Moreover, verification of a specification should be independent of the scheduling
policy to be finally implemented.
To make our verification perform on all possible execution orders of the MUV, we
have implemented a random scheduler by patching the current open-source SystemC kernel
implementation. The source of process scheduling is the evaluation phase, in which one of the
runnable processes will be executed. Given a set of N runnable processes in the queue every time at
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the evaluation phase, our random scheduler randomly chooses one of them to execute. The random
algorithm is implemented by generating a random integer number uniformly over a range [0, N − 1].
For more simulation efficiency and implementation simplicity, we employ the rand() function and
% operator in C/C++.
5.2. The Verification Flow
The verification flow using PSCV consists of three steps, as shown in Fig. 7. In the first step,
Configuration
File
Aspect Advice
File
C++ Monitor
Instrumented 
ModelMAG
AspectC++ SystemC-2.3 SystemC PluginPlasma Lab
Executable 
Model
SystemC Model
Figure 7. The verification flow consists of 3 steps: writing a configuration file, instrumenting the MUV using
AspectC++, and verifying the instrumented MUV using the SystemC plugin
users write a configuration file containing a set of typed variables (observed variables), a Boolean
expression (temporal resolution), and all properties to be verified. MAG translates the configuration
file into a C++ monitor and a set of aspect-advices. The set of aspect-advices is then used by
AspectC++ as input to automatically instrument the MUV to expose the user-codes state and
simulation kernel’s state in the second step. The instrumented model and the generated monitor
are compiled and linked together with the modified SystemC kernel into an executable model.
Referring to the running example, users can define the set of observed variables V obs =
{ c read , nelements }, where c read is the character read in the FIFO buffer and nelements is
the number of characters in the FIFO buffer. The temporal resolution will be defined as Tr =
{MON TIMED NOTIFY PHASE END }, where MON TIMED NOTIFY PHASE END is one of
18 predefined Boolean observed variables which refer to the 18 kernel states [33]. That means that a
new state in execution traces is produced whenever the simulation kernel is at the end of simulation-
cycle notification phase or every one nanosecond in the example since the time resolution is one
nanosecond. The full configuration file is included in the source code of the example§.
Finally, SystemC plugin, a plugin of the statistical model checker Plasma Lab [3], simulates
independently the executable model in order to make the monitor produce execution traces with
inputs provided by users. The inputs can be generated using any standard stimuli-generation
technique. These traces are finite in length since the BLTL semantics [35] is defined with respect to
finite execution traces. The number of simulations is determined by the statistical algorithm used by
the plugin based on the absolute error and the level of confidence. Given these execution traces and
the user-defined absolute error and confidence, the SystemC plugin employs the statistical model
checking to produce an estimation of the probability that the property is satisfied or an assertion that
this probability is at least equal to a threshold.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We report the experimental results for the running example and also demonstrate the use of our
verification tool to analyze the dependability of a large embedded control system. The number
of components in this system makes numerical approaches such as PMC unfeasible. In both case
§http://project.inria.fr/pscv/producer-and-consumer/
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studies, we used the 2-sided Chernoff bound algorithm with the absolute error  = 0.02 and the
confidence 1− α = 0.98. The experiments were run on a machine with Intel Core i7 2.67 GHz
processor and 4GB RAM under the Linux OS with SystemC 2.3.0, in which the checking of the
properties in the running example took from less than one minute to several minutes. The analysis
of the embedded and control system case study took almost 2 hours, in which 90 properties were
verified.
6.1. Producer and Consumer
Let us go back to the running example in Section 3, recall that we want to compute the probability
that the following property ϕ satisfies every 1 nanosecond, with the absolute error 0.02 and the
level of confidence 0.98. In this verification, both the FIFO buffer size and message size are 10
characters including the starting and ending delimiters, and the production and consumption rates
are 1 nanosecond.
ϕ = G≤T (( c read = ′&′)→ F≤T1 ( c read = ′@′))
First, we compute Pr (ϕ) with various values of p1 and p2. The results are given in Table I with
T = 5000 and T1 = 25 nanoseconds. Obviously, the probability that the message latency is smaller
than T1 time units increases when p1 and p2 increase, where p1 and p2 are probabilities that the
producer write to and consumer reads from the FIFO channel successfully. That means in general
the latency is shorter when either the probability that the producer successfully writes to the FIFO
channel increases, or the probability that the consumer successfully reads increases.
p1\p2 0.3 0.6 0.9
0.6 0 0.0194 0.0720
0.9 0 0.0835 1
Table I. The probability that the message latency is smaller than 25 in the first 5000 nanoseconds of operation
Second, we compute the probability that a message is sent completely (or the message latency)
from the producer to the consumer within T1 time units over a period of T time units of operation,
in which the probabilities p1 and p2 are fixed at 0.9. Fig. 8 shows this probability with different
values of T1 over T = 10000 nanoseconds. It is observed that the message latency is just below 18
nanoseconds.
6.2. Embedded Control System
This case study is closely based on the one presented in [29, 21] but contains many more
components. The system consists of an input processor ( I ) connected to 50 groups of 3 sensors,
an output processor ( O ), connected to 30 groups of 2 actuators, and a main processor ( M ), that
communicates with I and O through a bus. At every cycle of 1 minute, the main processor polls
data from the input processor that reads and processes data from the sensor groups. Based on this
data, the main processor constructs commands to be passed to the output processor for controlling
the actuator groups.
The reliability of the system is affected by the failures of the sensors, actuators, and processors.
The probability of bus failure is negligible, hence we do not consider it. The sensors and actuators
are used in 37− of− 50 and 27− of− 30 modular redundancies, respectively. That means if at
least 37 sensor groups are functional (a sensor group is functional if at least 2 of the 3 sensors
are functional), the system obtains enough information to function properly. Otherwise, the main
processor is reported to shut the system down. In the same way, the system requires at least 27
functional actuator groups to function properly (an actuator group is functional if at least 1 of the 2
actuators is functional). Transient and permanent faults can occur in processors I or O and prevent
the main processor( M ) to read data from I or send commands to O . In that case, M skips the
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Figure 8. The probability that the message latency is smaller than T1 in the first T nanoseconds of operation
current cycle. If the number of continuously skipped cycles exceeds the limit K , the processor
M shuts the system down. When a transient fault occurs in a processor, rebooting the processor
repairs the fault. Lastly, if the main processor fails, the system is automatically shut down. The
mean times to failure for the sensors, the actuators, and the processors are 1 month, 2 months and 1
year, respectively. The mean time to transient failure is 1 day and I/O processors take 30 seconds to
reboot. In the model we represent 30 seconds as 1 time unit.
The reliability of the system is modeled as a CTMC [26, 40, 12] that is realized in SystemC, in
which a sensor group has 4 states (0, 1, 2, 3, the number of working sensors), 3 states (0, 1, 2, the
number of working actuators) for an actuator group, 2 states for the main processor (0: failure, 1:
functional), and 3 states for I/O processors (0: failure, 1: transient failure, 2: functional). A state
of the CTMC is represented as a tuple of the component’s states, and the mean times to failure
define the delay before which a transition between states is enabled. The delay is sampled from a
negative exponential distribution with parameter equal to the corresponding mean time to failure.
Hence, the model has about 2155 states compared to the model in [21] with about 210 states, that
makes the PMC technique unfeasible. That means the state explosion likely occurs, even if some
abstraction, e.g., symbolic model checking is applied. The full implementation of the SystemC code
and experiments of this case study can be obtained at the website of our tool¶.
We define four types of failures: failure1 is the failure of the sensors, failure2 is the failure
of the actuators, failure3 is the failure of the I/O processors and failure4 is the failure of the
main processor. For example, failure1 is defined by ( number sensors < 37) ∧ ( proci status = 2).
It specifies that the number of working sensor groups has decreased below 37 and the input processor
is functional, so that it can report the failure to the main processor. number sensors and proci status
are observed variables that have same type and value as the number of working sensor groups and
the current status of the input processor, respectively. We define failure2 , failure3 , and failure4 in a
similar way.
Our analysis is based on the one in [21] with K = 4 where the properties are checked every 1 time
unit. First, we study the probability that each of the four types of failure eventually occurs in the first
¶https://project.inria.fr/pscv/embedded-control-system/
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T time units of operation. This is done using the following BLTL formula F≤T ( failurei ). Fig. 9
plots these probabilities over the first 30 days of operation. We observe that the probabilities that the
sensors and I/O processors eventually fail are more than the probability that the other components
do. In the long run, they are almost the same and approximate to 1, meaning that the sensors and I/O
processors will eventually fail with probability 1. The main processor has the smallest probability
to eventually fail.
Figure 9. The probability that each of the 4 failure types is the cause of system shutdown in the first T time
of operation
Second, we try to determine which kind of component is more likely to cause the failure of
the system, meaning that we determine the probability that a failure related to a given component
occurs before any other failures. The atomic proposition shutdown =
∨4
i=1 failurei indicates that
the system has shut down because one of the failures has occurred, and the BLTL formula
¬ shutdown U≤T failurei states that the failure i occurs within T time units and no other failures
have occurred before it. Fig. 10 shows the probability that each kind of failure occurs first over a
period of 30 days of operation. It is obvious that the sensors are likelier to cause a system shutdown.
At T = 20 days, it seems that we reached a stationary distribution indicating for each kind of
component the probability that it is responsible for the failure of the system.
For the third part of our analysis, we divide the states of system into three classes: “up”, where
every component is functional, “danger”, where a failure has occurred but the system has not yet
shut down (e.g., the I/O processors have just had a transient failure but they have rebooted in time),
and “shutdown”, where the system has shut down [21]. We aim to compute the expected time spent
in each class of states by the system over a period of T time units. To this end, we add in the model,
for each class of state c , a random variable reward c that counts the number of times the system is in
the state c . Hence, it measures the time spent in the class c . In our tool, the formula X≤T reward c
returns the mean value of reward c after T time of execution. The results are plotted in Fig. 11.
From T = 20 days, it seems that the amounts of time spent in the “up” and “danger” states are
converged at 101.063 = 11.57 days and 10−1.967 = 0.01 days, respectively.
Finally, we approximate the number of reboots of the I/O processors, and the number of functional
sensor groups and actuator groups over time by computing the expected values of random variables
that count the number of reboots, functional sensor and actuator groups. The results are plotted in
Copyright c© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Softw. Evol. and Proc. (2016)
Prepared using smrauth.cls DOI: 10.1002/smr
18 NGO AND LEGAY
Figure 10. The probability that each of the 4 failure types is the cause of system shutdown in the first T time
of operation
Figure 11. The expected amount of time spent in each of the states: “up”, “danger” and “shutdown”
Fig. 12 and Fig. 13. It is obvious that the number of reboots of both processors is double the number
of reboots of each processor since they have the same behavior model.
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6.3. Random Scheduler
This case study‖ consisting of 3 examples evaluates our random scheduler implementation.
In example 1 and example 2, we implement a simple module with 2 thread processes. The
processes in the example 1 have no synchronization point using wait statement, while there is
one synchronization point in the example 2. When these examples are run, we can see that there
are 2 execution orders in the first example and there are in total 4 execution orders in the second
example.
Example 3 implements a SystemC model containing 3 threads. Each thread has 2 synchronization
points using wait statements with other 2 threads. As a result, each thread has 3 execution segments.
Therefore, there are totally (3!)3 = 216 execution orders. In the first evaluation, we run the model
216 times with our random scheduler in order to compute its coverage. We got about 136 different
execution orders or the scheduler coverage is 136/216 ∼ 63%. Second, we run the model until we
get all 216 different execution orders. Then on average we need to run the model 1382 times. In other
words, the dynamic random verification efficiency of the random scheduler is 216/1382 ∼ 15.6%.
It seems that the implementation with the pseudo random number generator (PRNG), by using
the rand() function, and % operator in C/C++ is not efficient. We are planning to investigate the
Mersenne Twister generator [27] that is by far the most widely used general-purpose PRNG in order
to better deal with this issue.
Figure 12. Expected number of reboots that occur in the first T time of operation
7. RELATED WORK
Some work has been carried out for analyzing stochastic systems with PMC, for example, the
dependability analysis of control system with PRISM [21]. PRISM supports construction and
analysis of models as Markov chains, determining whether the model satisfies each property
expressed in LTL. For example, the exact probabilities can be computed by PRISM. However, the
‖https://project.inria.fr/pscv/random-scheduler-examples/
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Figure 13. Expected number of functional sensor and actuator groups in the first T time of operation
main drawback of this approach is that when it deals with real-world large systems which make the
PMC technique is unfeasible, even with some abstraction, i.e., symbolic model checking, is applied.
SMC has been recently applied in a wide range of research areas including software engineering
(e.g., verification of critical embedded systems) [16, 36, 44], system biology [19], or medical
area [10]. For instance, in [9], a framework of verifying properties of mixed-signal circuits, in
which analog and digital quantities interact, was studied. The bounded linear temporal logic is
used to express the properties, then the design of circuit and the verifying properties is connected to
a statistical model checker. This approach consists of evaluating the properties on a representative
subset of behaviors, generated by simulation, and answering the question whether the circuit satisfies
the properties with a probability greater than or equal to a threshold.
Several verification techniques have been proposed for SystemC, for example, SystemC
Verification Working Group proposed the SystemC Verification Standard (SCV) [1] that provides
APIs to verify functionality of programs. However, SCV does not mention temporal specifications.
One can use SCV complementary to our verification framework in terms of automatically generating
inputs for the MUV.
One of the earliest attempts at checking temporal specification properties for SystemC models is
carried out by Braun et al. [4]. The temporal properties are expressed as Finite Linear Temporal
Logic (FLTL) and the temporal resolution is defined by the boundary of the simulation-cycle
notification. FLTL is linear temporal logic that interprets formulas over finite traces and supports
temporal operators with respect to the temporal resolution. Then they proposed two approaches
to extend test-bench features to SystemC for checking temporal properties: the checking is
implemented directly within the SystemC language as an add-on library as SystemC itself. The other
approach is to interface SystemC with an existing external test-bench environment, TestBuilder [6].
As described in [38], the temporal resolution defined at boundary of the simulation-cycle notification
is inadequate for SystemC verification, since it does not expose fully the semantics of the SystemC
simulator kernel, which gives much finer grained temporal resolution. For example, the simulation
may consist of a single delta-cycle if it is driven by immediate event notifications. As a result, the
simulation clock never advances.
There has been a lot of work on the formalization of SystemC [15, 25, 47, 46, 45]. In general,
the goal of the formalization process is to extract a formal model from a SystemC program, so that
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tools like model-checkers can be applied. For example, Zeng et al. in [45] translate a subset of the
operational semantics of SystemC as a guarded assignment system and use this translated model as
an input for symbolic executors and checkers. However, all these formalizations consider semantics
of SystemC and its simulator in some form of global model, and they also suffer from the state space
explosion when dealing with industrial and large systems.
Tabakov et al. [37, 38] proposed a dynamic-analysis-based framework for monitoring temporal
properties of SystemC models. This framework allows users to express the verifying properties
by fully exposing the semantics of the simulator as well as the user-code. They extend LTL by
providing some extra primitives for stating the atomic propositions and let users define a much
finer temporal resolution. Their implementation consists of a modified simulation kernel, and a tool
to automatically generate the monitors and aspect-advices for instrumenting SystemC programs
automatically with AOP.
8. CONCLUSION
This article presents the first attempt to verify non-trivial probabilistic and temporal properties of
SystemC model with statistical model checking techniques. In comparison with the probabilistic
technique, our technique allows us to handle large industrial systems modeling in SystemC as
well as to expose a rich set of user-code primitives by automatically instrumenting the user-code
with AspectC++. The framework contains two main components: a generator that automatically
generates a monitor and instruments the MUV based on the properties to be verified, and a
statistical model checker implementing a set of hypothesis testing algorithms. In comparison to the
probabilistic model checking, our approach allows users to handle large industrial systems, expose
a rich set of user-code primitives in the form of atomic propositions in BLTL, and work directly
with SystemC models. For instance, our verification framework is used to analyze the dependability
of large industrial computer-based control systems as shown in the case study.
Currently, we consider an external library as a “black box”, meaning that we do not consider
the states of external libraries. Thus, arguments passed to a function in an external library cannot
be monitored. For future work, we would like to allow users to monitor the states of the external
libraries. We also plan to apply statistical model checking to verify temporal properties of SystemC-
AMS (Analog/Mixed-Signal).
To improve the dynamic random verification efficiency of the random scheduler’s
implementation, we are also planning to use the Mersenne Twister generator [27] that is by far
the most widely used general-purpose PRNG instead of the default C/C++ generator.
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